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Introduction

The MICROCON consortium came together on the 2nd and 3rd July 2009 to begin to synthesize the programme's preliminary findings at the midway point of the programme, and to discuss the policy implications of those findings.

The report is structured by session, with discussions reported after each one. Day one consisted of an opening session giving an overview of MICROCON's progress so far and possible next steps. This was followed by short presentations by each Work Package Leader outlining findings so far and possible cross-programme synergies, followed by a brainstorming session in the afternoon. Day two focussed on policy implications and influence, and started with three orientating introductory addresses. These were followed by four thematic sessions presenting possible policy implications.

Day 1: Synthesizing preliminary research findings from the micro-level analysis of violent conflict

Session 1 – Violent Development: Tracing Behavioural Foundations of Conflict and Reconstruction

Patricia's presentation summarised the progress of MICROCON to date, and its relation to conflict policy. It suggested four axes that we can use to summarise our emerging findings, and four sets of questions for discussion in the afternoon session.

The presentation started from the concept of 'violent development': Violence cannot just be seen as 'development in reverse', but we should recognise how violence can be the basis for structural change. Conflict is inherent in development, is an everyday part of the development process, and in many cases conflicts are managed and resolved through violence. Violence adds to uncertainty and insecurity, but can also be bred from uncertain environments where conflict cannot be managed through non-violent means. But violence can also lead to more certain and secure environments for people. It is important to understand the mechanisms and channels that make violence a possible strategy amongst other forms of group behaviour.

There are a number of basic questions we have been asking so far:
- When and how do violent conflicts and non-peaceful ways of living and governing become viable strategies?
- How do conflict and violence become entrenched in society? Why do some societies give rise to violent group strategies to influence political power, while other societies do not?
- What does violence do to people, groups, communities, institutions (formal and informal), the state and the relations between them? How do these respond to violence?
- What institutions shape peaceful but also violent behaviour?
- What are the consequences of violence to the development process?

There are also a number of issues that we need to think about in translating our research into policy: What have we learned that leads to innovative policies? Is the emphasis on evidence making a difference? To synthesise the lessons to date we can talk about three main sets of issues:
- Defusing mechanisms and institution-building – breaking long-term negative legacies of conflict and building on positive structural changes
- Development policies to halt the use of violence as a strategy to influence allocation of political power

- Understand relationship between institutions (prior to conflict and those established during conflict) and the behaviour of citizens

The programme is making a number of methodological innovations, by working and thinking across different levels of analysis; establishing stronger theoretical and empirical foundations for peacebuilding policies and post-conflict reconstruction; and relying on fieldwork using mixed methods, multidisciplinary and comparative approaches.

Behavioural foundations of violent mass conflicts
So far we have learnt that individual, household and group behaviour matters. Life goes on during violent conflicts, and people continue to operate as actors – they are more than victims, and it is important to take into account individual, household and group agency. In terms of the conflict cycle, we've learnt that conflict is not necessarily a shock for those affected by it, and that it is something with long-term legacies. We have also seen the importance of taking into account all intensities of violence, from local tensions to violent protests to civil war to genocide. To understand violence it is vital to understand the relationship between different levels of actors, from the individual to state institutions.

Empirical evidence is fundamental to understanding these mechanisms, and multidisciplinary analysis is central to building the foundations of these mechanisms. Also, when we are thinking about micro-macro linkages, it is the micro-level that provides the foundations for understanding the mechanisms – for example, in understanding how adaptation to the economic downturn may affect support for rebel groups.

We have plenty of evidence so far, but where are we going next? Can our findings result in effective policies to break the cycle of conflict and misery? We need to integrate empirical findings with policy. To take stock of where we are we need to synthesise accumulating evidence into four axes, to describe the behavioural foundations of violent development:

1. Disagreement over policies and the legitimacy of institutions
Individuals and/or groups often disagree over design, implementation and ownership of policies set by government or ruling elites. This disagreement will not lead to violence when there is a strong feeling of being represented by institutions. Violence may occur when groups of citizens are not represented, and the accumulation of dissatisfaction creates the foundations for violent mobilisation.

To reflect more on these issues there are a number of other questions we need to answer: What are the conditions under which disagreement with policies or institutions give rise to armed struggle, mass violent behaviour, government repression, terrorism or other forms of violent conflict? When does the social contract break down? Examples of issues to consider further are:
- The importance of individual versus group behaviour within institutional environments.

- Types of behaviour: opportunistic behaviour; resistance; other motivations for participation; costs of staying out.
- Collective action: at what point does individual behaviour make a difference to the group outcome?
- Can we derive links from individual/group behaviour to state building processes?

2. Heterogeneity of actors, countries and conflicts
Conflict contexts are characterised by extreme forms of heterogeneity (between actors, countries and contexts): this is not particular to conflict analysis but it is quite crucial. For example, low GDP per capita is a robust determinant of civil war, but this finding lacks a clear micro-foundation because it is consistent with several models of individual behaviour:
- low opportunity cost of fighting due to unemployment
- even when employment is possible joining rebel groups may lead to increased earnings
- grievances against government and societal norms (horizontal inequalities, ethnic/religious exclusion)
- low capacity of governments in poor countries to protect civilians against violence
- low capacity of governments to win battle and defeat rebel group

So one type of behaviour – joining a rebel movement – is consistent with at least five micro-explanations. Finding the 'right' explanation in each case (and there can be more than one at work at the same time), makes a difference for the choice of policy to stop violent conflict: should it be counter-insurgency, employment generation, safety nets or local crime reduction?

Some further points for discussions were:
- Other examples of heterogeneous individual and group behaviour in conflict contexts?
- How is individual and group behaviour affected by the type of conflict?
- What is the importance of real versus perceived heterogeneity?
- How is it connected to grievances and/or opportunistic behaviour?
- Heterogeneity amongst not only citizens but also armed actors: are rebel groups always the 'bad guys' and government the 'good guys'? How do different perspectives influence the effectiveness of policy?

3. Triggers of conflict and participation in violence
We need to understand the opportunity structures that generate violent outcomes, and to distinguish between structural causes and triggers/proximate causes (e.g. Rwanda). This could involve some discussion of tipping points and thresholds. Triggers of violence may only be loosely linked to group and leader strategies to foment violence, as well as to motivations of participants to take part in collective violence. But we can say that violence emerges when elite strategies, triggers and motivations of the rank-and-file converge. This process of convergence results in violent development.

Further points for discussion were:

- (How) does a micro-level lens allow distinction between triggers and causes of violence?
- How do we link group/leader strategies to motivations of participants?
- When do elite strategies, triggers and motivations of the rank-and-file converge?

4. Duration and the legacy of conflict

The legacy of conflict for people can affect wellbeing, welfare and poverty, as well as social choices - people are agents and not just victims. The legacy of conflict for institutions can generate new forms of governance - although there's very little evidence for how violence changes institutions. It can also lead to more or less participation in decision-making processes and the design and running of institutions; and to governance by rebel groups – such institutions bred by violence can in fact provide certainty and security to people's lives. The legacy of violent conflict also has implications for conflict itself: it can lead to re-ignition of violence or a conflict cycle; or to peace dividends and peace agreements.

Further points for discussion:
- How to link development policies to long-term legacy and conflict dynamics
- How to design/implement changes in institutions that change incentives for local populations
- Duration of conflict (dynamics of conflict) versus duration of legacy (long-term effects)
- Conflict shock versus process
- Endogeneity of conflict shock: when it is a shock – for whom? When does individual/group behaviour influence the course of conflict?

Session 2: Work Package presentations

WP3 – Group Formation, Identities and Mobilisation - Frances Stewart

Project 1 is mainly carried out by DIW Berlin. The first is looking at naval mutinies and non-violent sea journeys, according to UK port authorities and insurance firms between 1700 and 1900. The project uses quantitative analysis to try to discover the risk factors that make rebellion more likely – such as pay, linguistic diversity and training etc. The first paper is under preparation, but there are no results to report so far.

Project 2 is a study of the Orange Revolution in the Ukraine, looking at determinants of participation using household data from the Ukrainian longitudinal Monitoring Survey. The data has been cleaned, and a few preliminary results are emerging. Firstly, about 12 per cent of the population supported the Orange side, which was identified with the West, and only 3 per cent supported the Blue side, which was the Russian side. The main motivations were duties as a citizen, solidarity and curiosity, and economic motivations did not seem to play much of a role. Then, using multivariate probability regression they identify key drivers of mobilisation. If someone had a preference for Western democracy, then this increased the likelihood of participation, as did a preference for the Ukrainian language, a higher level of education and living in large cities. This was a peaceful mobilisation, and an issue for this project is whether what drives people to peaceful protest is the same as what drives people to violent protest.

Project 3 has been looking at a number of countries. In Peru they have been looking at perceptions survey data which reveals some motivations including deep and ongoing perceived racism. They have also been looking at the Truth Commission, which has yielded some very interesting findings because at the beginning of the research people were telling the team that there was no difference between people in Peru, and that everyone was mixed, but by the end of the research people were saying very different things.

Yvan Guichaoua has been working on the Oodua People's Congress (OPC) in Southwestern Nigeria, and the Mouvement des Nigériens pour la Justice (MNJ) in Niger. In the Nigerian case, people seem mainly to have been joining the OPC because they are searching for security (though this organisation is not violent at the moment). People's reasons for joining the MNJ seem to be more complex but exclusion and marginalisation, especially ethnic marginalisation seem to play an important role. Also the lack of access to the riches associated with uranium mining and heavy-handed repression by the Nigerien military have played important roles. Another aspect of the mobilisation is that people enjoyed joining the organisation, which gave them an idealistic feeling of solidarity, and perhaps allowed them access to a fulfilling masculinity.

Within this project, Frances has been looking at Muslim mobilisation on a worldwide basis and relating it to the framework of horizontal inequalities (HIs) and finding very

deep HIs between Muslim populations and others – within European countries and within almost any developing country where you have a Muslim population which is not in the majority, and also between Islamic and non-Islamic countries, and at a social, economic and political level - this inequality can explain some mobilisation. She reinforced this by looking at some of the links between Muslims in different parts of the world, and there are strong links with potentially important policy implications. Similar work is being done by Mansoob Murshed, and Frances has also been working on ethnic and religious mobilisation and whether and how they differ.

A recent addition to this area of work has been two INCO-funded students who have been doing very fine-grained empirical work on Côte d'Ivoire. Peer effects were very important in this study, and also the role of the state was important. Whether the state decides to vigorously repress dissent can be an important factor in mobilisation – not just because people are angry, but also because people may feel less vulnerable in the armed organisation than as an isolated civilian.

Project 3 is looking at the origins and foundations of militias in the Mano River countries, trying to find out the effect of international policies in supporting the transition to more peaceful politics. They are using surveys focus groups and interviews and have just finished the fieldwork in Liberia in May so cannot yet report results.

Project 4 is looking at patterns, processes and mechanisms of recruitment of children and adolescents to armed groups in Colombia, using qualitative and quantitative interviews but there are no results yet.

The general findings from the WP are that there is a variety and combination of motives in each conflict – it is not possible to just talk about one. There are differences between leaders and followers; and also between individual motives and group motives. There are differences across conflicts – there is no one cause that applies across conflicts, and causal factors also change over the course of conflicts. Finally, gender differences are important in all these conflicts: masculinity is important in Yvan's work - all the rebels in the Niger conflict are men, and in some work that CRISE is doing in Guatemala, it seems that the motivations of some women to join militias is to escape family hierarchy – which does not apply so much to men.

WP4 – Contemporary Conflicts and Ethnic-Religious Tensions – Michael Emerson

Project 5 is proceeding in two parts. The first part is already finished and a book and a number of policy working papers have been published. This part developed a typology of radicalisation and violence in Europe in peoples with minority Muslim cultures: Belgium, France, the Netherlands, the UK, Spain and Russia. This research proposes a matrix on the typology of violence: one axis differentiates between violence by Muslims on non-Muslims, by non-Muslims on Muslims and by Muslims on Muslims. The other axis differentiates between politico-religious violence, religious non-political violence, and political non-religious violence.

The second part of the project is about the search for more adequate models of multiculturalism; or to find a balance between the two stereotypes of integration by assimilation represented by France; and of the very marked communitarisation of the minority communities, represented by the UK, although both of these countries are now uncomfortable with the status quo.

Maybe the main contribution to the overall MICROCON synthesis is that the matrix is documented for all five countries. Russia is an interesting case (excluding the Chechnya conflict) and this is the first time it has been documented. It is by far the group leader in amplitude of violence: there are 26 listed incidents, leading to 1,556 deaths, of which Beslan in 2004 and Dubravka theatre in 2002 are just two. The author predicts increased Islamisation and Sharia-isation of the Northern Caucasus and the Volva Muslims. The comparison between the Netherlands and Belgium is interesting: they both have substantial Moroccan Muslim minorities which arrived at the same time and in the same conditions roughly speaking. The Dutch case has become very sharply polarised between the majority and minority communities and of course has led to a couple of politicised assassinations. In the Belgian case there are tensions, but there has not been any violence.

This leads to a comparison with Mansoob Murshed's paper on Muslims and inequality, which argues that identity plus inequality equals conflict. The Belgian case is interesting: it is hardly a country at all, and the sense of identity is quite weak with Belgians not really knowing who they are, whereas the Dutch do know who they are. Mansoob's paper is very interesting, and the factors it mentions are very important (disadvantaged groups and identity) but in addition Olivier Roy emphasises the jihadist narrative, which is specific and operational but has allowed rebels without a cause to connect with a cause, and he makes a connection with the Baader Meinhof gangs and the Red Brigades who committed very violent acts but eventually burnt themselves out. He argues that Islam should be considered as just another of our religions, and the young people who are involved in violent acts to be as relevant to Islam as the Baader Meinhof gang is to Christianity.

The wave of violent incidents in Europe appears to have peaked in 2005, and it is interesting that it seems to have been waning since then. There is also an interesting micro-macro consideration in this project: suicide bombing is a very micro phenomenon and comes down to the psychology of individuals, but it links with the ideology of

Islamism, which is globalised, linked to Arab-Israeli conflicts and complaints about the global order.

Project 6 is on inter-ethnic, inter-religious tensions, mainly in Bulgaria, but also in some neighbouring countries. The starting point of the analysis is social constructionism although they are not extremists in this respect. To simplify, they start with the assumption that the world is as we perceive it, that is we orient our actions according to our perceptions, stereotypes and shared assumptions. So the main working concept is that of social normativity, understood as shared assumptions of what is normal, what is good and what is due; or what Patricia referred to as perceived heterogeneity. They are trying to relate it to what Patricia referred to as real heterogeneity. Fieldwork has been carried out in a number of locations: Five in Bulgaria, one in Turkey, one in Macedonia and one in Bosnia Herzegovina.

The methodology is in-depth narrative interviews in these localities, with members of Turkish communities and Muslim communities, and Bulgarian, Macedonian and Bosnian communities and Christian communities. They have built a database of 120 interviews in Bulgaria, which are in the process of being transcribed. 17 interviews have been completed in Turkey; in Macedonia and Bosnia Herzegovina, only preliminary visits have been undertaken.

There are two components to the analytic approach. One is the approach developed by Fritz Schütze and Gabriele Rosenthal which is the interpretation of interviews through a close and intensive reading of a few 'key' interviews. The other approach is informed partly by grounded theory and consists in a two level coding to find out the main themes expressed in the interviews.

The findings for the Turkish respondents emphasise the vindication of identity – past humiliations (during the forced assimilation of Turks in the 1980s) being compensated by present ethnic pride. This is a legacy of conflict, as Patricia mentioned. The findings from the Bulgarian respondents emphasise the construction of threat. Bulgarians tend to be irritated or to feel uneasy with Turks being 'too conspicuous' – Turkish is being spoken in official settings, Turks have their own institutions such as a political party and a Turkish theatre, and they are also economically active. The working hypothesis was about the salience of religion – this was not confirmed. People do not tend to self-identify on a religious basis.

So the first thesis is that religion and culture are being used as a political argument, and here the project comes close to findings of project 5. The second preliminary finding is that economic tensions and inequalities are being re-thought and conceptualised in ethnic terms. The integration of the Turkish minority leads in some cases to a radicalisation of the Bulgarian population in the target areas, though not in Bulgarian society at large. The fourth finding is that there is acceptance of Turks on an individual basis – as friends, neighbours, colleagues, etc – but not at an institutional level.

Project 7 is looking at the Western Indian state of Maharashtra, looking at 12 districts, where the survey work is just about to begin. The main conceptual narrative of violence they are looking at is civil violence, but also a range of other kinds of violence – some armed rebellion, gang violence and incidents of police brutality. One interesting aspect they are looking at in terms of the structural consequences of violence is the private provision of security.

WP5 – Gender Aspects of Violent Conflicts - Colette Harris

Gender encompasses the most micro levels – sex and the marital bed – but it is also connected through all kinds of family relations right up to the highest levels of society and international relations. So what happens in people's sex lives and what happens in Washington are connected in very basic ways. This means that gender is fundamental to violence, and if we overlook it we will miss a great deal. Gender is important not just because men are the main perpetrators of violence, this is just arithmetic. It is important in terms of the deep psychological motivations which bring people to violence.

Project 8 is investigating the return of IDPs. In Uganda they are working on the return from the IDP camps, after the conflict in the north of the country with the Lord's Resistance Army. The team has been doing fieldwork fairly separately from one another, but have come to similar conclusions. Firstly, that masculinity seems to be the most important issue in the return, where women and children are being pushed back into positions that they supposedly occupied before the conflict. Interestingly, whilst still in the camps, men brought up the issue of masculinity, whereas women were more interested in practical issues such as clothing and schooling. During the return masculinity has also been a major issue, with men having the idea that NGOs, with their talk of rights, have destroyed the 'goodness' of the women and children.

Secondly, there are economic issues: 10 to twenty years after the conflict started, there is no longer the subsistence economy where the men control the land. Also, young people can get education and jobs, which removes them from the economic control of their parents and upsets masculinities. Thirdly, men are no longer to live up to local ideas of masculinity because they can no longer provide support to their families. Finally, the issue of land rights has become extremely important for the Acholi people: women do not have full citizenship in the sense that they marry into another clan, and only have land rights through their husband. If they do not have a formal husband, then it is very difficult for them to get land, and hard to get land for their children. So the question of male privilege and masculinities is absolutely central in this situation.

Colette encouraged all the projects that have not so far thought about masculinity in their work to try to tease out the implications that it may have for their analysis.

Project 9 is being implemented by Kathleen Jennings at Fafo AIS, and is looking at the connections between local peacekeeping economies and local sex industries. They are looking at four cases: Bosnia Herzegovina, Kosovo, Liberia and Haiti. In all of them there is very significant mistreatment of the local population for their own sexual pleasure and for money: trafficking of women and making use of sex for masculine entitlements. The power they have is linked to the sense of entitlement of certain masculinities, which is added to by the soldiers being out of their local context and having the extra power and money that goes with this.

Project 10 is looking at the wellbeing of women and children in conflict, using longitudinal household data from Indonesia. There are not many concrete findings so far, except that after conflict there are less men available for marriage, allowing them to 'marry up'.

WP6 – Migration, Displacement and Refugees - Anna Lindley & Ana-María Ibáñez

Ana María's presentation focussed on the findings of four papers published so far in this WP, the first three of which are from project 11 which is led by Ana María at the Universidad de los Andes, and the fourth of which is from project 12, based at the University of Oxford.

The first paper is entitled, 'The Impact of Intra-State Conflict on Economic Welfare and Consumption Smoothing: Empirical Evidence for the Displaced Population in Colombia', and was co-authored with Andrés Moya. The objective of this paper was to examine the welfare losses of displaced populations and to identify the impact on the ability of households to cope with future shocks. The results suggest substantial declines in labour income and consumption, and the disruption of formal and informal mechanisms to share risk, meaning that the income shock is translated into consumption. The paper also looked at income generation programmes in these contexts, and found that benefits are limited to a short period of time – income increases for a few months. However, aggregate consumption is unaffected and households continue to rely on costly strategies such as school interruption. The impact of these programmes disappears rapidly upon their completion.

The second paper is entitled, 'Do conflicts create poverty traps? Asset losses and recovery for displaced households in Colombia' and is also co-authored with Andrés Moya. This paper aims to examine asset losses during internal conflicts, and the process of accumulation following conflict shocks. It finds that conflict and forced migration result in substantial losses of physical, financial, human and social capital. Conflict dynamics exert a heavy toll on assets for those households that are victimised: through reactive displacement and the death of male household heads; households with larger assets and formal holdings tended to lose a large amount of assets. Asset accumulation seems to be determined by a longer period of settlement at destination sites, access to credit, insertion in labour markets and those with a less vulnerable household structure. This accumulation is, however, very slow, leading the team to hypothesise that these households are left with such a small asset base that it is very difficult for them to escape poverty. However, they do not have panel data to confirm the hypothesis.

The third paper is entitled, 'Labour Market Effects of Migration-Related Supply Shocks: Evidence from Internally Displaced Populations in Colombia' and is co-authored with Valentina Calderón. This paper looked at the labour market effects of forced displacement upon the native population. It finds that forced displacement deteriorates labour markets for the local population. Wages fall, particularly for vulnerable groups such as informal workers, especially those who are women. Participation in informal employment rises sharply, and overall wages fall by 28 per cent. Informal wages fall by 60.4 per cent, informal wages for women fall by 61.2 per cent and informal employment increases by 5.4 per cent.

Project 12 looks at the causes and processes of migration in the Somali regions. The field research focused on people arriving in Somaliland, and consisted of 38 qualitative interviews; 12 focus group discussions with 58 participants (with migrants and locals); and consultations with over 30 UN and aid workers, business people and government officials. This was supplemented with data from secondary sources such as UNHCR's Population Movement Tracking Data. The research finds that there is an interface between conflict and mobility. The main causes of displacement from the Somali regions, besides macro causes are the loss of human capabilities of resources, through the death or victimisation of a household member. Many of the displaced face the destruction of physical and financial assets at home, and so do not have anything to keep them where they are. Also, many social groups used to have social-political protection from other groups, but during the intensification of the violence this protection was reconfigured, so that often people were left unprotected. The project also studies the whole journey of migration, from the decision to leave to arrival at the settling site which is interesting because there is not much evidence on this so far.

WP7 – Risk, Security and Coping Mechanisms - Philip Verwimp

This WP looks at three main issues:

- 1. The long term effects of conflict shocks on wellbeing
The whole WP uses panel data, and supplements them with another data source – such as on prices, rain levels or effects of violence.

In the Burundi case (project 15) Philip is working with Tom Bundervoet. They find that in villages that experienced violence, consumption growth was 10-15 per cent lower in villages that did experience violence than in villages that did not. There are also people who joined armed groups in the Burundi case, and seem to have done very well out of this. One issue is that they do not know what is driving this mechanism. It may be that these people are finding jobs at the end of the war, or are able to protect their wealth or to gain wealth through looting.

In the Rwanda case (project 14), Philip and Christophe Müller are looking at the strategies households use to cope with conflict, and tries to disentangle violent effects and non-violent effects: Does the death of a household member by non-violent causes have a different effect on a household than a member being killed? How and why is the effect different?

Tilman Brück and Carlos Bozzoli have been looking at Mozambique, and the effect of violence on activity choice – their findings have been published in the Journal of Peace Research.

- 2. The effects of conflict on social capital
Philip has been looking at the social effects of violence with Maarten Voors and Eleonora Nillesen at Wageningen University. They have been carrying out economic games to find out what the preferences are of households affected by conflict compared to those unaffected: preferences towards time, risk and social behaviour. One of their findings is that there are positive effects of war. In the bio-social research community they find that war makes people co-operate – as you are forced to work together to defeat your enemy. The research has found that those living in villages affected by the war are more altruistically minded compared to villages not affected by violence. This finding is surprising, but is supported by research from other contexts.

- 3. The effects of changes in the price of export commodities on conflicts in various countries
There has been a lot of literature on this, especially in the cross-country macro literature – do price shocks influence violence? This WP is looking at the micro-aspect of this: Christophe is looking at mineral exports from the Congo, and Philip and Eleonora are looking at coffee in Burundi. They find some effect of export commodity price variation on rebel recruitment at the community level – these results are published in the MICROCON Research Working Paper series.

WP8 – Poverty, Inequality and Social Exclusion – Julie Litchfield

There are four projects in this WP. Project 18 looks at conflict in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, and involves Julie and Elodie Douarin at the University of Sussex, Rachel Sabates-Wheeler at IDS, Roman Mogilevsky at the Centre for Economic and Social Research, Kyrgyzstan and Mara Rusu at the Institute of Agricultural Economics, Romania. It analyses the welfare outcomes of past conflict, looking at current living standards and livelihood choice. It also looks at the scope for conflicts to both worsen and improve living standards. Costs can include the loss of household members, damage to assets and disruption of networks; whereas there can also can be new opportunities due to a changing status quo, for example through migration and remittances, and the redistribution of production assets.

The project uses existing data: on violent conflicts they have data for one year after the conflict, and in Tajikistan for two years after the conflict. On latent conflict they have data on tensions surrounding Kyrgyz and Romanian land reforms.

Project 21 is being carried out by the University of Cape Town, and is looking at violence in South Africa, and has two components. The first is qualitative research on experiences and perceptions of everyday violence in low-income areas of Cape Town. It looks at experiences of violence in the home, neighbourhood and elsewhere, and on the interlinkages between these. The second component is qualitative and quantitative research on aspects of the xenophobic violence across South Africa in May 2008. In one neighbourhood in Cape Town the team have carried out interviews and group discussions, primarily with adolescents, and questions on quantitative indicators were identified for inclusion in a follow-up survey to be conducted in 2009.

Project 19 is being carried out by Christophe Müller and Moshik Lavie modelling participation in conflict. It also has two dimensions. The first looks at self-selection into violent conflicts, examining the factors facing potential leaders, soldiers and supporters. It examines both internal factors (productivity shocks, inequality in capital, etc.) and external factors (relative economic resources, opponents' strength, etc.) The idea is that people have an idea of the potential outcomes of their involvement in the conflict, which influences how they decide to get involved.

Project 20 is already finished and its results are published in the Research Working Paper 4: Poverty Dynamics, Violent Conflict and Convergence in Rwanda. It looks at poverty dynamics and violence during the period of the civil war and genocide in Rwanda, examining the differential economic impacts at provincial level. It finds that there was convergence at province level, as initially richer provinces suffered much lower levels of economic growth. This mirrors the findings from a small panel study of households in the country. The loss of physical assets (land or houses) seems to have been much more significant than the loss of labour, though this depends on the violent or non-violent nature of the loss.

Emerging themes and synergies in the WP are the common focus on ethnic conflict; the significance of land ownership and the size of land holdings (which is possibly proxying for social status or hierarchy); the opportunities that conflict provides to change the status quo; and migration as a source of and response to conflict.

WP9 – Violent Conflict and Health Outcomes – Olivier Degomme

The conceptual framework divides the health effects of conflicts into intermediate effects and long-term outcomes. The intermediate effects are divided into direct effects (such as injuries due to bombing, shooting or rape) and indirect effects such as infectious disease and malnutrition that can result from collapse of health systems, displacement or reduced food security. The long term outcomes can be full recovery, impaired health or death. The framework, along with possible synergies with other projects, is summarised in the following diagram:

Project 22 looks at mortality, malnutrition and distress in conflict areas, and aims to compute excess deaths in conflict-affected populations; study the incidence of diseases during conflicts and investigate the importance of displacement; and develop a model linking factors influencing morbidity, mortality and malnutrition at community level. The research has so far focussed on mortality, malnutrition, disease in Darfur; mortality in the DRC; and health infrastructure in Thailand. It uses data from the Complex Emergency Database based at CRED; Darfur Humanitarian Profile data; hospital data on TB, malaria and dengue from southern Thailand and data on violent events, deaths and injuries from Thailand.

Preliminary findings for Darfur indicate that during 2004 mortality was seven times higher than expected during peacetime; and displacement was correlated with higher diarrhoea-related mortality and lower violence-related mortality. The excess death toll is estimated at around 300,000, of which 2/3 were after the situation was said to have 'stabilised'. In the DRC, analysis based on 218 data points of mortality rates found that from 2002 to 2008 conflict-affected areas had mortality rates that were 2 – 3 times higher than in non-affected areas. In Thailand, since the outbreak of violence there has been no change in number of people tested for malaria, but a shift from large hospitals to smaller malaria clinics. There has been an increase in positive tests.

Project 23 is being carried out by Adeline Delavande at Universidade Nova de Lisboa, and looks at violent conflict and the spread of HIV/AIDS. It aims to evaluate the impact of the conflict in individuals' investment in human capital, particularly looking at HIV/AIDS. It is using data from Uganda DHS surveys, and the Armed Conflict Location and Event Dataset. The variables used are age at first sexual intercourse, abstinence, condom/contraception use, age at marriage, ante-natal care and education; conflict intensity and a conflict dummy. Preliminary findings indicate a lower likelihood of abstention among single men and women, a lower likelihood of using contraception, a higher age at first marriage and a lower number of years of education for males under 30 years old.

Project 24 is being carried out at Fafo AIS, and aims to assess the health consequences of long-term conflicts in IDP camps in Northern Uganda. They are using household data collected in 2005 and 2007, but have no preliminary findings so far.

WP10 – Governance and Institutions – Timothy Raeymaekers

The common threads in this WP are a focus on: formal and informal institutions, the state as one actor amongst many (an approach using regulatory pluralism), and endogenous institutional and governance processes (although through different methodological approaches). Also, all of the projects use qualitative methods, such as participatory methods and occasionally surveys.

Projects 26, Water Management and Violent Conflicts, and 28, The Political Economy of Entitlement to Resources in Rural Tanzania, look at internal processes of conflict regulation, particularly in self-organised resource governance systems where actors are involved over time in making and adapting rules within collective choice arenas. This is an institutionalist perspective, and these projects look at contributing factors to resource conflicts where there can be an absence of rules, or conflict emerging from conflicting rules. Mechanisms exist to try to resolve these conflicts, such as rotation schemes as an answer to conflict over access to water. Institutions can of course also contribute to resource conflicts, as they are coordinating devices, and define entitlements. So there are power issues here that can sometimes lead to very violent conflicts.

The questions in both of these projects are how formal and informal institutions shape violent and non-violent conflicts, but also the different strategies that individuals and groups develop to control, enforce and ensure their access to these resources. Both projects try to bridge these two levels of analysis by looking for example at individual and community characteristics that are conducive for collective action, or contributing factors to resource conflicts.

The general observations in these cases, and we can talk only about Tanzania at this point, are that there is a great deal of regulatory pluralism, and a combination of formal and informal rules to regulate access with a tendency towards an informal and non-confrontational mode of managing these conflicts. There is also the issue of power heterogeneity that Els Lecoutere uses, which looks at political and social inequalities from a relational perspective. She finds that this kind of heterogeneity is conducive to conflict, as it is really embedded in the institutional make up, but also determines individual behaviour towards these institutions. For example, people with different social characteristics may react differently to certain rules, may be more or less inclined to collective action because they value resources differently.

Projects 25, Governance Without Government in Post-Conflict Fragile State Settings, and 27, Land Usage Rights in the Southern Ivory Coast, deal with governance using a more structuralist approach. Rather than focussing on individual characteristics, they look at how institutions constrain individuals from building stable and settled lives, developing on the work of Paul Richards and Patrick Chabal in West Africa. Institutions are described more in terms of opportunity structures – in what ways do institutions limit or empower people in their claims for wealth, power and representation. How do people move and try to survive in their present lives. So they are looking at trajectories,

attachments, claims and attitudes throughout daily practices, and what the role of institutions is in these practices in blocking or enabling them in building stable lives.

Findings so far include the observation that what some people term as 'post-conflict', and others term a 'no war, no peace' situation, has not only created frustrations and opportunities for the socially mobile, but has also created new sites of inclusion and exclusion that partly remain embedded in pre-war institutional practices and repertoires. It has been remarked that these conflicts have generated even more antagonism, which might seem like an obvious statement, but it is really interesting to see not why this happens, but why this is the case. A second point is that there seems to be an emerging conflict between the internal and external aspects of institution building. Whereas you have an exogenously imposed framework of peacebuilding, demilitarisation, resettlement, etc, that can create certain opportunities for some people; the power of certain non-state institutions in post-war society creates new governable spaces that involve new concepts of territoriality and belonging that exist next to the official state and peacebuilding framework. This makes it difficult to integrate long-term processes of structural change with official structures of peacebuilding.

A final and important question is how we reconcile the different levels of analysis. Firstly whilst we are concentrating primarily on the endogenous institutional aspects of change, we need to acknowledge that institutions can mean two different things at the same time: on the one hand they are endogenous projects of access and rights regulation, but are also active instruments of inclusion and exclusion, domination and regulatory political power – of governance, in other words. How we can combine aspects in our definitions and methodological framework is a crucial issue. Secondly, we know that behaviour is determined by the institutional set up, and conflict can proceed from this set up, but how do individuals cope, circumvent or influence this set up – is this purely a matter of coping and survival, or are there other mechanisms at play? So do we only have to look at individual characteristics, or also at relational aspects and capillary power organisation? So there is the interesting issue of rule breaking and the ability of individuals to bend or change certain institutional set ups.

WP11 – Conflict in the European Neighbourhood - Nathalie Tocci

This project only started a year ago, so preliminary results are only just beginning to emerge. The project started off with Nathalie setting out an overarching conceptual framework which will guide the fieldwork and inform the comparative part of the project which will start in the autumn. The general question tackled in the WP is the link between the EU, civil society and conflict, in particular the role that local society can play in conflict resolution, and how EU policy can become more effective (or not) by engaging with local civil society. So the general premise underlying the project is that if the EU is not just interested in conflict management and conflict settlement, but also in conflict transformation, then engagement with local civil society should be a central element of that policy. The project does not assume that civil society plays a positive role in conflict transformation, and takes an analytic rather than a normative approach and looks at a broad range of actors including NGOs, youth movements, trades unions, social movements, student movements, and so on.

The different impacts that civil society organisations (CSOs) have on conflict can schematically be looked at in terms of whether they have a fuelling impact, a holding impact or a transformative impact on a conflict. The project looks at the different interactions between these categories, and the different ways in which CSOs can have impacts within these different categories. So within the 'transformative' category there might be actions which contribute to mutual recognition between groups, contribute to changing the cognitive narratives within groups, building peace constituencies, as well as tackling the structural underpinnings of conflicts. In the 'fuelling' category CSO actions might have a direct securitising impact on a conflict, for example by presenting an 'other' as posing an existential threat and calling for special measures to tackle them; or there can be a de-securitising impact, where a group counter-mobilises and tries to counter human rights abuses, which is a fuelling impact but may lead to conflict transformation in the long run.

The project also looks at the factors affecting the effectiveness of these civil society activities, both looking at the relationship between civil society and the state, and also at relations within civil society. So the analysis has a rule of law element, as well as a set of time-contingent factors which at particular times may hinder or facilitate particular civil society actions.

The work then moves on to look at the EU's effect on these civil society activities, and sets out three broad hypotheses:
1. The positive hypothesis: The EU directly and/or indirectly aids transformative impacts, either by changing the overall opportunity structure in which civil society operates, for example by opening up the political space for civil society; or it can directly engage with civil society through dialogue, through positive socialising effects, or through training or funding.
2. No impact hypothesis / Gramscian hypothesis: The EU either does not engage with local civil society or only engages with the state level, or does engage with civil society, but in a way that does not open the political space for civil society to have an impact.

3. The negative / leftist hypothesis: EU engagement creates a distorted form of local civil society, which responds more to the top level funding imperatives, rather than those from civil society.

The first paper by Nona Mikhelidze and Nicoletta Pirozzi provided an overview of local civil societies in the five societies the project is looking at, which are: Western Sahara and Israel/Palestine to the south of the EU; and Transnistria, Abkhazia and Nagorno-Karabakh to the east. Then Natalia Mirimanova is doing some interesting work trying to work out what kind of impacts these civil societies might be having. The empirical work started in winter 2008 in the five case study countries. This involved interviews with a set of CSOs from the broad spectrum outlined in the analytical framework, but also a set of cross-checking interviews with different kinds of actors to determine the impact that the CSOs' activities are perceived to have had. These interviews will also seek to determine the extent to which these activities were supported by or informed by the EU in any way.

The general sense so far is that the positive hypothesis tended to be an aspiration rather than a reality. Most of the feedback from CSOs related to this hypothesis in terms of what the EU could be doing, but is not doing, for example engaging with problematic groups through civil society, when it is unable to engage directly with the group in question. There were some positive stories to be told, such as in the case of Armenia and Moldova, but they tended to have more to do with EU effectiveness on governance questions through civil society, rather than on conflict questions. But most of the results seem to fit the Gramscian hypothesis or the leftist hypothesis. In cases such as the Palestinian case, but also in the cases of the non-recognised entities, the EU does engage with civil society, but tends to be enamoured with the visual graphics of peace – such as projects involving people to people contact – but the projects seem always to involve the same people over the years and those people become gradually dislocated from their society. The EU seems more reluctant to engage with organisations that are more involved in promoting cognitive changes within conflict contexts, either because they are uncomfortable or because the EU does engage with CSOs, but only those that the national governments are comfortable with. So for example in Morocco the EU simply funds a range of government-organised NGOs of different sorts.

The empirical papers from the countries should be ready by the autumn, and from then on the comparative part of the project will start, followed by the policy part. This should result in a number of working papers and an edited volume in the next couple of years.

Session 3 - Brainstorming

Table 1- Disagreement over policies and the legitimacy of institutions

The first group started by reflecting on the question of what the social contract is, and how it breaks down. What rules and enforcement mechanisms does it comprise?

The breakdown of the social contract can lead to conflict if the government breaks it. Conflict can erupt if people think that one group is benefitting more from the social contract than others, or if people think it is illegitimate. In Bulgaria the social contract is based on the idea of ethnic identity. Now that Bulgarian Turks have some of their own institutions, the ethnic Bulgarians feel that the social contract has been broken. If elites do not have the opportunity to profit from the social contract then they may encourage people to form armed groups.

Coping responses to the breakdown of the social contract can be collective, or if it impacts on individuals, then coping strategies such as migration can be the result.

During the discussion it was pointed out that even activities such as bribing can be part of the social compromise (rather than social contract), and do not represent the breakdown of society. Bribing can also be an adaptation to badly functioning government structures, and a group that feels disenfranchised because they are unable to bribe may turn to violence. It could also be a question of social sub-contracts – for example in Mumbai there are local people who provide all kinds of social services, and also act as political entrepreneurs. In Uganda there are similar people, but politicians can have them working for their own account. These endogenous institutions need to be constantly legitimised, or the government will be undermined. The existence of social contracts in Africa was questioned, due to the effects of colonialism in producing their political systems.

Table 2 - Heterogeneity of actors, countries and conflicts

This group was looking at the question of heterogeneity, and discussed three points:

1. Heterogeneity of actors: There are many regions and reasons for joining armed groups that are related to age, gender and ethnicity. However, violence can also be a cause for homogeneity, with people finding common cause with one another.
2. Group behaviours: Ideology can provide the impetus for action rather than the search for a livelihood strategy.
3. Differences between real and perceived heterogeneity: If heterogeneity is perceived then it is real.

The discussions centred on the question of the power of perceptions, and the difficulty of changing them. In Kaduna, Nigeria for example there was a perception by two different social groups that the other group was better off than them, even though they were more or less equal – this perception of inequality led to violent riots. Factors like perceptions can sometimes be missed by quantitative researchers. There was a suggestion that social scientists can combat such false perceptions through the media, but the example of Belgium was given to argue that it might not be that simple. In Belgium there is perceived inequality between Flemish and Walloon people but little inequality in reality. Social scientists presenting empirical evidence on this through the media has not been effective in changing perceptions.

However it was agreed that social scientists have an important role to play in combating these perceptions. It is important to think about how perceptions become ingrained, and about how whoever is speaking is perceived in different social groups – it is not just presentation of evidence that changes attitudes. The example of the Bosnian Book of the Dead was given as an example of successful influencing by social scientists – the study found that there were only around 100,000 deaths, compared to figures such as 300,000 that were popularly cited. After a year-long public debate on the study, the figure of 100,000 came to be generally accepted, and that each side had suffered many casualties, and not just one side or another.

A note of caution was also suggested – it is a signature of the social sciences to continually debate their own foundations, but perhaps we do not need to go into so much depth. We would presumably all agree that perceptions are not reality but are negotiated, although they are not arbitrary either.

Table 3 - Triggers of conflict and participation in violence

The table defined a trigger as a short term factor, where a causal factor has 'accumulated' beyond a certain point and something causes the balance to 'tip' into violence. Causes were thought of as longer term factors such as poverty or inequality.

To find a trigger or cause, we may need a narrative. But why do we need micro-level analysis for this? Can we not also use a macro-analysis for this? To take the example of Lesotho, you have a number of macro-level measures that would suggest that it should be a violent country – such as poverty, and you could also think about potential macro triggers. However, the violence that these indicators would predict is not happening, so it is important to go to the micro-level to find out the motivations of individuals.

To answer the second and third questions under this heading ('How do we link group/leader strategies to motivations of participants?' and 'When do elite strategies, triggers and motivations of the rank-and-file converge?') we need to look at how leaders govern their groups. There is a two-way relationship between the motivations of leaders and participants: participants can also influence the strategies of leaders. To find out the motivations of individual participants, it is necessary to go to the micro-level. The special contribution of this insight is that it credits participants with agency, rather than just seeing them as victims.

The table outlined a number of areas that need further research: What is the legacy of being part of a conflict for people's situation after the conflict? Is it possible to know triggers before they happen? Is it possible to set up an early warning system for conflict? What are the causes and triggers of institutional change? In looking at these questions it is important to differentiate between different types of leaders and followers – long-term and short-term; low, middle and high-level. What can we find out about the underlying causes of conflict on the micro-level in order to know how to take preventive measures? For example, we might look at families – are they able to resolve conflicts without resorting to violence?

In the discussion it was remarked that there are two widespread, mistaken ideas about armed groups: Firstly that more people joining is better; and secondly that anyone can join. Leaders might have their own ideas, and do not only come into contact with other combatants, but also other people who are important to take account of, such as accountants. Also, if it is a long conflict, women may become involved in armed groups as people are more willing to create a new kind of social model. These questions are not determined by a magic law of supply and demand, they are choices that people make.

Another way of trying to add value to the micro-lens is to trace people's trajectories as a basis for joining militias. For example, Philip Verwimp talks about trajectories in his work, and life histories can add some texture to this.

Table 4 - Duration and the legacy of conflict

This table only managed to tackle the first question under this heading: How can we link development policies to the long-term legacies of conflicts and to conflict dynamics?

It is important that we are careful as outsiders, interfering in other countries. Examples of this are the US government taking action against the Sharia courts in Somalia which have had such a stabilising effect there; or the West supporting Museveni against the rebels in Uganda, when his human rights record is perhaps as bad as theirs. We should also move away from ready-made prescriptions, and ask people in each country what they think should happen there – this means thinking about who should be consulted, and who is representative.

It also raises the question of which level we should work at: With national governments or with local entities that seem to be more effective, such as chiefs? How does one judge with whom to work? Another question the group raised was whether we should always support democratic reforms such as obligatory elections, or look at these questions on a case-by-case basis.

The discussions partly focussed on the World Bank's approach to post-conflict reconstruction. Some argued that critiques of the Bank's approach were sometimes too simplistic – partly because there does not seem to be a well-articulated alternative to their approach: they have 'jumped in at the deep end of the pool', and are doing the best they can. But also because although there are local specificities which need to be taken into account, there are also 'boring' economic policy approaches which are more a matter of technical expertise. Then there is the Stiglitz critique that says that the Bank has been excessively liberalising, which has surely been borne out by recent events – but this does not mean that the whole approach is necessarily wrong, and it is too sweeping to say that the Bank systematically ignores the local context.

However, other people pointed out that some marketisation reforms have probably promoted conflict – such as abandoning commodity stabilisation funds. Also, the Bank's current template seems to conceive of violent conflict as 'development in reverse', with market reforms acting on a 'blank slate'. However, this approach can often treat people on the ground as passive victims rather than agents, and we need to understand how entrepreneurs are perceived, and how they use different types of institutions to get what they want. Others rejected the concept of a paradigm, and argued we should focus on the methodology we are using for analysing local situations – this does not mean romanticising the 'local' level, but looking at policy on a case-by-case basis.

There was also some discussion around the question of perceptions: it is very rare to find out what people at the local level think about policy interventions. But it is very difficult to measure perceptions, and it can be easier to look at what people actually do. For example, when analysing the lack of follow-up of demobilised soldiers it is important to ask what they think of the World Bank's approach, but we should also look at what they did with the $500 demobilisation grant they received.

Day 2 – Development Policy in Violent Contexts

Opening Addresses

Patricia Justino

MICROCON is a five-year research programme implemented by a consortium of 24 research institutes from around the world, carrying out 30 projects. It began two and a half years ago, and at this half-way point preliminary results are beginning to emerge, and we are taking stock of what kind of policy impact we want to have.

The first purpose of MICROCON from the beginning was to seek to fill the research gap of micro-level analysis of conflict, at a time when conflict analysis was still emerging. We use the concept of the cycle of conflict, and analyse the individual and group interactions that lead to and result from violent mass conflicts.

The second purpose was to influence domestic, regional and international conflict policies, putting individuals, households and groups at the centre of interventions. The second day of this year's MICROCON workshop aims to reflect on how we can translate the first round of research results into policy relevant implications/contributions. We aim to link micro-level evidence to policy processes in peacemaking and post-conflict reconstruction. MICROCON is divided into 13 Work Packages by research theme, and these have been divided into four sessions according to topic: Individual and group motivations for mobilisation into violence, including gender identities; institution-building during and after violent conflict, including the role of civil society; migration, displacement and health; and poverty and coping-effects of violent conflict at the individual and household levels and strategies for adaptation to violence.

Angela Liberatore

The excellent review by the European Commission demonstrates that the project and the research are progressing well. This day was initially called a "training day", and was initially directed at policymakers but has not really progressed as planned as not many policymakers chose to attend. So Angela used her talk to discuss how best to engage with policymakers effectively.

MICROCON has been one of the pioneers of EU-funded research on conflict and peace, and remain the only integrated project, meaning large-scale project, looking at conflict. In the Seventh Framework Programme this important area of research is more established

and some MICROCON researchers are also involved in FP7 projects on conflict. Unfortunately this area of research tends only to get interest when there is a crisis.

Conflict and security issues, within European research area now comes under the heading 'Europe in the World'. This might seem a bit Euro-centric, but they are trying to put it in perspective, and some of the first research that was funded was on how Europe is seen from the outside, and what ideas people outside Europe had on issues such as conflict, peace and human rights. At the same time there is a whole security framework programme, which is run by DG Enterprise. The initial division of labour between these two programmes had the security programme looking only at homeland security, and not at issues of 'root causes' which were seen as too long-term. However this kind of sharp distinction is beginning to change and so there is some consideration of issuing joint calls by both programmes.

It is a period of transition in the EU, and it is not clear whether the Lisbon Treaty will finally be ratified or not. In any case, DG Research is focussed on research and should not be driven according to policy imperatives, so this area of research should continue to be funded.

In terms of this meeting – many policymakers from outside and inside the European institutions were invited to this event, but very few decided to come. Angela asked the participants why they thought this was. It was suggested that the meeting was perhaps too general and not focussed enough for policymakers' concerns. They may also be too busy, but also may think that it is not relevant: they are focussed on day to day concerns, whereas researchers have more long-term ideas about how things should be done. Policymakers are often not able, anyway, to influence fundamental long-term issues, and so there perhaps does not seem to be much reason to come. Other comments suggested that the results of our discussions so far are not operational enough, and that next year we are likely to have more concrete results that are more interesting for a policy audience. Although others thought that at the 'local', field level, some of our results are already very practical.

Angela agreed that all of these points were valuable, but challenged the idea that policymakers did not attend because our results were not operational enough. She gave the example of a Seventh Framework Programme project event (Project ATLAS) on transitional justice that she had recently attended that is at an earlier stage than MICROCON, and yet had policymakers from intergovernmental organisations and NGOs attending. She had the impression that this was because the researchers in the project had established and maintained contacts with people working in their relevant field. The EU review of MICROCON thought that the project was already breaking new ground in a number of areas, both thematic and geographical, and that establishing links between this 'substance' and the policymakers likely to be interested in it was important.

Eddy Boutmans

Eddy started by giving some details about his background: He is a member of MICROCON's Advisory Board, but was also speaking as an external adviser. He has been a lawyer at the bar for more than thirty years, but has also published academically mainly in criminal law. From 1995 to 1999 he was a member of the Belgian Parliament for the Green Party, and for four years after that he was the Minister for Development Cooperation in the Belgian government. After that he took a sabbatical year to study Social and Cultural Anthropology.

The subject of today's meeting is the difficult relation between social science research and development policy. When Eddy was in office he had a very good and able collaborator in his staff, whose main ideology was that there are no quick fixes, and you must look at the long term. He provided a lot of good advice, but could not give advice about what to do in the short term. As Keynes said, "the long run is a misleading guide to current affairs: in the long run we are all dead": similarly policy is often about acting without overseeing all the long-term consequences. One can, however, contribute through research to narrowing the gap between the imperative of taking actions and the lack of information about long term consequences.

Most of the audience for MICROCON's research are probably academics, and the higher up one goes in policy organisations, the less papers people are likely to read. So how do we get our insights to a level where it can be sown into policy? One handicap is that the more one knows about a problem, the more complex it becomes. Science is not about making things simpler, but about making them more complicated, and policy cannot cope with all of the nuances. The influence on policy will be increased through the simplification of findings, and the formulation of immediately applicable advice.

So, who should we direct these messages to? First of all, the European Commission: this is the largest and best resourced political policy body in Europe. However conflict and security policies are still predominantly made at the national level. At the national level there are therefore also people who could be consumers of MICROCON research. It is also important not to neglect the non-deciding, but controlling and inspiring organisations such as parliaments, peace NGOs and the press. The better the insight of journalists into the issues that MICROCON is looking at, the better the feedback they will provide on the policies that are being carried out.

How do we get our messages to these people? Clearly it cannot just be by organising events such as this and inviting people to them. The papers that you are writing can become relevant at an unexpected moment: you should be able to react to what is happening when a region or issue is brought to wide attention.

In terms of content: Angela said that it is important to know how Europe is perceived from the outside. This is from two points of view: we want Europe to be perceived as a positive force, but if we are intervening in a conflict in some other country, it is important to know how those people perceive our interference. More often than not though, we do not know this. If you are working at the micro-level you can use several methods to find

out what people really think at this level. For example, in a thoroughly Muslim country, how do they perceive nominally Christian westerners distributing aid? We do not really know.

It is Eddy's impression that Europe is perceived in many parts of the world as a source of values, such as human rights, but is also very much criticised. This could be because people dislike our values, or because of the difficult relation between expressing values and acting on values. We are not always very consistent, and it is possible to site many examples of Western interventions that have lack any logic with their own principles. So, in some cases it is important to think about whether we should seek to have influence rather than interfering. Perhaps MICROCON's research will have something to say about that.

It is important to note that conflicts are not negative as such. We would not have our developed democracies without conflicts in the past, and even without violent conflicts. So let's not try to avoid all conflicts, but to help people fight out their conflicts without resorting to violence.

A final remark in terms of who policy advice can be directed to: There are a lot of policy bodies, means, techniques and funds – but the big money is in the development agencies, who also have a lot of interest in conflict and the opportunities they represent.

Discussions

It was mentioned that DFID requires its research projects to produce 1-page, 3-page and 30-page summaries of their research, which can be a very useful exercise, and tool for dissemination. The role of the European Council was also mentioned: the Council wants to see information on specific countries or specific issues. There have been events hosted at the European Parliament by research project in windows of attention. Nation states can also contribute to the organisation of events at the Council. It is important to bear in mind that the source of invitations to such events is important.

It was also suggested that we are missing a bit of the intellectual background on how to make the transfer of knowledge work. We are talking about research and policy in terms of supply and demand – researchers supply papers about what they have learned, and we hope that the way this meets with demand will produce something positive. But the demand for policy is driven by short term political imperatives, and our outputs can enter into particular political agendas that take a particular line. We need to be aware of how the outputs we produce are used, and so we need to know what the mechanisms for the transfer of information are in these bodies.

Individual and group motivations for mobilisation into violence, including gender identities

Yvan Guichaoua

Much of this area of MICROCON's work focuses on violent mobilisation. Why do the rank and file join violent organisations? What are the leaders' motivations? There is also an organisational aspect: How can the expectations of the followers be matched with those of leaders? The work draws on Weinstein's theory of mobilisation: If leaders have quick access to finance then they simply pay followers; if not then they need to resort to other factors: ideology, social capital, ethnic ties, etc. The approach uses a mixture of qualitative and quantitative methods, with a strong focus on identity.

One issue that we all agree is very important is the development-security nexus. This has almost been turned on its head now to the extent that there is often the impression that security has become the major goal, and development has become a way of 'winning hearts and minds'. Our observations suggest that development should be a priority in itself, rather than just a part of a counter-insurgency doctrine. Within the development agenda you could include policies to reduce the multidimensional aspects of horizontal inequality, such as educational, employment, cultural policies and power sharing arrangements – with the objective of building inclusive societies. To design these policies we need to know about these inequalities, which also means developing analytical and statistical tools to measure inequalities.

Insecurity is an important issue, however, and this work does not dismiss it. On the other hand, security does not just mean counter-insurgency, but also the protection of vulnerable populations – which is directly linked to the attitudes of the security forces who can sometimes increase insecurity. The impression we have from our observations in the field is that it is a matter of quota. If you have a minority leading an insurgency against a central state, just allocating them 20 per cent of officer posts in the security forces will not work. These questions need to be thought of in the long-term: just allocating posts to one generation of people will not help, as people will eventually retire. Also security is about more than having a share of the national 'cake': when you control the coercive means, you also control the accession processes and access to bribes, which is very important in highly informal economic systems. So it is an issue of sovereignty, power-sharing and economic distribution, rather than merely a sectoral issue.

Turning to reintegration programmes: there is a very important question of roles. These programmes should be organised in a timely manner, fairly and transparently, and need to be sustainable over the long term. What is the point of giving someone €250 after the conflict to start a cooperative, when often people have to wait a long time to receive the money, and it is administered in a completely un-transparent way? It could be argued in Niger, that this kind of system directly led to the resumption of violence in the country. The rebels had been struggling against their government, but also against a form of government that was instituted by the central government and by their own leaders, who

managed to get a seat at the negotiating table. There was a deliberate and cynical effort to co-opt the leaders, which might bring peace in the short-term, but does not solve the structural problems of followers.

Another issue that can be acute is natural resources. When societies experience a 'shock', such as discovering natural resources, or a price shock that gives natural resources a greater stake in the economy, feelings of marginalisation can be increased. Natural resources do not necessarily cause conflicts, but can often worsen them through the channel of horizontal inequalities.

There is also the specific issue of gender which was particularly prominent in the Latin America case, where there were many women fighting. There is a consensus that in the post-conflict era, women are often forced to go back to their notional status before the war, whereas male ex-combatants are better able to benefit from demobilisation programmes.

The final point is the question of whether there are ways to build early warning systems. Are there ways to monitor levels of discontent in a society, and can we establish some kind of measurable threshold beyond which policy action is required? For example, in Niger, a good measure could be drought: when there is a drought people will lose cattle and people will have to move to the cities, and discontent will become more acute. One important preventative policy that this research suggests is for employment for young people and for men in particular – this is a very pragmatic message for development agencies in general.

Discussion

The discussions focussed on three main issues. Firstly, power-sharing was discussed and it was noted that it is important to be precise about what kind of arrangements we are talking about: who are they between, and for how long will they last. In the 1960s, power-sharing in Colombia included the major groups, but some important minority groups were excluded and many researchers blame this arrangement for the current conflict. Exclusion from power and politics as well as exclusion from socioeconomic opportunities can cause conflict, and not necessarily just national scale conflict, but also more localised tensions if it is regional minorities who are excluded. Nigeria is an interesting case in this respect. Also, just because an arrangement causes violence does not mean that it should not happen. A difficult and related problem is how to divide riches, because they can allow political entrepreneurs to mobilise. Power-sharing might not be the right term, but the question of whether to adopt a federal system or another kind of system is also important.

The second issue was that of early warning systems, and 'leading' indicators that could make these systems possible. It was suggested that there are two possible types of systems: one monitors underlying risk factors such as poverty and inequality; and the other looks at peaceful protests and preaching of hatred. However it is important to keep a critical perspective: all political currents can be said to be mobilisations of hatred in the

beginning, even class mobilisations. If we class movements in these terms which seem a bit naïve, we will not have a critical perspective on the social dynamics of social discourses.

The problem of measurement was also raised: there can be a lot of 'noise' when trying to measure factors such as discontent. We are trying to understand what is the content of discontent, and we need indicators: we can count number of deaths etc, but the problem is that these indicators are relative to the situation and to the structure of society. We need to know the social structure and economic structures within which they take place. These indicators are related to specific policy decisions – they are also sensitive to the kind of actions that the policymakers plan to take. We should propose new indicators which are not sensitive to policies. The research for project 1, on the Orange Revolution, has shown that we need much more detail about how protests unfold – just having single numbers is not enough, we need to understand the processes by which violence can erupt.

Also, if MICROCON is to develop an early warning system, then we should bear in mind that there are many early warning systems already in place – it will be interesting only if what it says is additional to what is already being said.

Thirdly, demobilisation was discussed. It was suggested that it would be interesting to trace the trajectories of fighters after conflicts have ended: what leads some ex-soldiers to make the career move from soldier to minister, leaving others behind with nothing? There are also some ad hoc decisions made in this respect by the international community: why are some people brought to the Hague and others allowed to pursue career success? Finally the question was raised as to why gender analysis was considered critical. The example of the Peru research was given again – where women were forced back into the positions they notionally occupied before the war, whereas men were able to benefit from DDR programmes. On the other hand war could create the opportunity for a new social model to arise, with new gender roles.

Institution-building during and after violent conflict, including the role of civil society

Nathalie Tocci

This session focussed on governance and civil society, and especially on EU policies towards these issues. Similarly to the last session it looked at how institutions and power sharing can channel conflicts through peaceful means, and the accommodation of different identities through peaceful means. This can be problematic, and create new conflicts, as well as reinforcing existing identity clashes. An example of this is the Cyprus case, where the only identities considered relevant in negotiations are Turkish and Greek Cypriot, excluding other minority identities. This can cause future conflicts due to exclusion, and also reinforces dichotomous identity formations.

The question of official institutions links to the question of civil society, as how these institutions operate affects the amount of space that there is for associational life to exist. In this respect there are positive and negative effects to explore. An example of the latter is when institutions do not function properly, and civil society becomes a substitute for those institutions. This can have very negative repercussions, and can result in very un-civil forms of civil society – where it substitutes the state's functions, but is not guided by the same rules as the state. This also changes the balance between the state and civil society.

In terms of civil society itself, MICROCON's work on civil society does not take a normative approach to it, but an analytic and descriptive one. This connects to the question of institutions and to the question of independence: civil society is conceived of as a space for collective autonomy, but not as entirely independent of the state. Such a conception would set the bar too high, and would also exclude a number of very important actors from the analysis. The question of autonomy is important, and this means not just autonomy from the state, but also from external actors, particularly international donors.

Timothy Raeymaekers

Something that came out of the discussions on the first day was that we need to be clear about what we mean by 'institutions'. It is clear to social scientists that we are not talking about a building or office. An institution is about how things should be regulated, the rules of the game. There are bottom-up mechanisms for dealing with conflict, and institutions can be active mechanisms of inclusion, exclusion and domination, in short of governance.

Timothy focussed on outside interventions in fragile states. This is an interesting topic because reforms in such states in the past 15 years, whether the Democratic Republic of Congo or Afghanistan, have consisted of a fairly similar package of measures. These include security reform, demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants, political

settlements and democratic transition. This approach is based on the idea that it is important to "get the institutions right", but which has the consequence that plans devised for, say, Afghanistan, look horribly similar to those tried in the DRC. The obvious discrepancy between stated goals and available resources is a problem, and such resources as are deployed are quickly withdrawn after elections take place: The ideal of these interventions often differs a lot with what happens on the ground.

Reconstruction should be seen as a long term 'job', and one that cannot proceed everywhere according to the same criteria. Until the 1990s the West maintained a very ambiguous attitude towards democratic reform in post-conflict states, particularly in Africa, and there was no strict enforcement of conditionality. There was no automatic relationship between aid levels and regime type in Africa in the 1980s and 1990s, and some governments were rewarded for their authoritarian tendencies, for example in the Ivory Coast and Cameroon.

Since the new millennium, there seems to be two new prescriptions for post-conflict reconstruction, which are elections and power-sharing. However, we know that elections are not a panacea, are often manipulated and can do very little to change entrenched power dynamics. We are also seeing that the institutionalisation of power sharing is turning the logic of conflict prevention on its head, as it sometimes encourages would-be leaders to embark on the path of opportunistic violence. To be blunt, from the Dayton agreements to the agreements to end the Congolese and Ivorian conflicts, the message that we risk sending out is that violence pays. Some analysts call this 'elite recycling': the persistent rent-seeking behaviour of elites, both inside and outside government. As a result of this institutionalisation of power sharing, we see the emergence of some very illiberal democracies that are led by former incumbents or rebels that now have the cover of 'legitimacy' to crack down on basic rights.

The second critique of the idea of the 'liberal peace' is related to our ideas of social change. This theory proposes that the darker passions will be broken down by interests, and that if you keep people occupied in cooperative activities, this will discourage 'distorting' behaviour. For example, the policy prescription of power-sharing arrangements is inspired by this idea, that they will promote cooperation and moderation amongst contending groups by introducing a sum game of political interaction. The problem here is that it neglects the political economy of violence, which is central to many contemporary and historical processes of state formation. So rather than seeing conflict as a 'distortion' it might be more interesting to look at it as a system in which the aim might be more to accumulate as many social, political and economic benefits as possible, rather than to actually win the fight. Analysts such as Charles Tilly for example, tell us that violent conflict and strategies of accumulation have been central to state formation, and armed protection rackets have always been, and continue to be connected to states and markets in a variety of ways. Whether you can qualify governments as protection rackets as Tilly argues is open to discussion, but the point is that the distinction between legal and illegal economic activity, and benign and negative service delivery, and representative and exclusionary government, remains a normative distinction.

So, peacebuilding is much more than a technical capability, it is essentially political and it will generate conflict. Consequently, deciding who owns the legitimate monopoly of the means of violence inevitably involves normative action, and in the absence of such a decision, criminalised war economies will likely evolve into criminalised peace economies, and autocratic regimes will likely evolve into illiberal democracies. These things are already happening in the Great Lakes region of Africa and the Balkans to some extent. Some say that we have to militarily support democratic change.

Another emerging discourse in policy circles is that "it is alright to talk to the Taliban", or other type of group. This is another extreme that is problematic. We risk ending up with an approach of "anything goes", that it is OK to engage with whoever provides security. What is our criteria in deciding who to work with, and how do we help these partners be more effective in tackling problems such as structural violence? Nathalie raised the point that there are a number of other groups apart from the state who play important roles, such as social service provision. So there are a range of different opinions about how to tackle the post conflict period, but the point is that the choices made will be normative.

Discussions

The main focus of discussions was the question of how to decide which groups should be supported in conflict and post-conflict situations. It was suggested that these choices are often linked to strategic considerations rather than normative criteria. Policymakers struggle with such decisions every day, and often lack the understanding to make informed choices. There is also the question of what evidential basis donors should use to construct the criteria for choosing partners. This is an area where MICROCON could make a useful contribution, and can help us understand how to be effective in selecting partners for delivering conflict resolution or democratisation, and to see which factors are context-specific, and which are more constant across contexts.

In this vein, we need to look at the different forms of engagement that different actors have, and how this affects communication: we need a broader understanding of what affects the effectiveness of different groups. The question of the inclusion of rebel groups in peace processes is also important: if rebels are not included then they can act as spoilers as they are armed. Including them is risky, but excluding them can be even more risky. On the other hand, excluding rebels can inadvertently legitimise rebels, but it is important that the peace process does not become a rent-seeking mechanism. We also need to challenge the misunderstanding that there needs to be peace before development can start – actually development can help to foster peace.

Migration, displacement and health

Anna Lindley

The number of people migrating across national borders has dramatically decreased in recent years, with the total number of refugees worldwide now totalling "only" 11 million – which is down from a high of 40-45 million. On the other hand the number of internally displaced people has increased, as borders become more hermetic after the Cold War, and these people are left without any UN mandate for protection. IDPs are estimated to number at about 40 million, although this is difficult to estimate.

Anna started off by presenting some 'thinking points' based on her research in Somalia and Ana María Ibáñez's work in Colombia, in order to prompt a discussion of related policy issues. The first issue she tackled was the analysis of, and responses to the challenge of protracted displacement and refugee situations. As in many long-term conflicts, the dominant narrative amongst the international community about Somalia is one of constant crisis, development in reverse, of criminality and extremism. This robs the Somali regions of their history, important continuities in that history, micro-level areas of stabilisation, and emerging political complexes which provide a degree of security for civilians.

However, this narrative has been important in shaping the international response to the situation in the Somali regions. Critical reflections by humanitarian workers have pointed to a kind of functional ignorance amongst aid agencies about the political landscapes and the political impacts of often poorly monitored aid interventions for IDPs. In the words of one aid worker,

> "we might have been working blindly for the past 18 years, at best by omission, and at worst by convenience, this constant state of emergency prevents us from really assessing the consequences of our actions".

As in many of the contexts we work in, this rhetoric of constant crisis has been used to justify not learning lessons and not thinking about the long-term consequences of compromises to humanitarian principles.

Outside the country, long-term refugee status is defined as "a long-lasting state of limbo, where rights are denied and the absence of durable solutions" (such as return, resettlement or local reintegration). Important needs remain unfulfilled, leaving them reliant on international assistance. These situations are classified as static and unchanging, and the people caught up in them as passive and housed in easily identifiable warehouses. However, the experience of Somali refugees in Kenya challenges this narrative of stasis. There have been significant changes underway in terms of membership, with people moving back and forth and to cities and third countries; and also in terms of the demographic make up of the refugee population. The situation has also changed radically in the past 20 years in terms of geopolitics with the hardening of

security concerns in Kenya and dwindling funds for refugee protection. Changes have also resulted from refugees seeking their own solutions to their problems.

Response to protracted refugee situations, has been dominated by discussions of interactions with the institutions and methodologies of humanitarian assistance. There has been less attention to refugees' livelihoods beyond the official refugee regime, and on mobilising political will in favour of refugees. In this context an interesting question is: in response to international shocks can international paradigms of assistance be changed? Such a shock is the wave of massive violence in south-central Somalia due to the ousting of the Islamic courts in 2007. There are now more than 1 million IDPs in a population of 7-8 million and numbers of refugees in Kenya are at their highest level since 1992. The past two years have been an unmitigated disaster for Somalia.

This situation might force change on international agencies, and there are a number of developments that seem hopeful, including the inauguration of the ex-Islamic courts leader as president, the election of President Obama and the lack of military strikes in the past months. There is also evidence of a more critical turn in humanitarian agencies: in response to a media exposé WFP has launched an enquiry into food aid being allocated to fake centres and redistributed through the market. The displacement shock has forced UNHCR to collaborate with Kenyan agencies and other UN agencies over issues like allocation of land to refugee camps – this kind of collaboration has long been advocated. We might also take the new Kenyan refugee act as an opportunity – if it is implemented so as to start to dissolve the deadlock posed by protracted refugee situations and develop better response. It could also be used as a tool to respond to the crisis if it gave refugees clear and recognised rights.

Second area of interest is that of migration dynamics that accompany the transition to peace. Discussions of policy on displacement in post-conflict situations have always been on return and reintegration of displaced people. A lot of interesting work has been done in this area, exploring shifting notions of 'home', and shifting livelihood aspirations of refugees which mean that return is often not their preferred option. Policy concerns in this area include the absorption capacity of labour markets in post-conflict fragile states, the issue of potential tensions between returnees and stayees, and the issue that mass returns could destabilise economies.

Beyond return there has been less attention to other migration dynamics which often accompany transitions to peace. They are not part of what we traditionally think of as the refugee cycle and are part of broader frameworks of human mobility and development. So you may have fresh emigration dynamics emerging, as many people including returned refugees struggle to cope in post-conflict economies, and emigration may follow wartime patterns, or may change in response to new opportunities. The dynamics of the diaspora's actions may shift in response to the transition to peace.

The policy questions in this area are the absence of opportunities to emigrate in dignity, and there are increasing migration controls in both the North and South. However the post-conflict period often closes off asylum possibilities and researchers now start to talk

about 'survival migration', related to livelihood collapse, state integration and environmental change. These migrants do not fit into official refugee categories and do not have access to protection. Also, the issue of managing remittance economies is important. Obviously these are private flows, but there may be ways for governments to intervene to relieve bottlenecks to expatriate investment, and access to financial infrastructure can allow the recirculation of remittances and avoid capital-rich underdevelopment.

Finally there are also fresh immigration dynamics in post-conflict settings. Surges in investment and physical reconstruction can spur regional labour migration and some post conflict states in turbulent regions and quickly become host states for people from other countries in the region. Also, as authorities reclaim or redefine borders they can redefine what constitutes immigration and emigration, and new minorities and majorities can be created, as has happened with the Roma and other groups in Kosovo. Two main policy issues emerge: how are migrants in these contexts inserting themselves into the political order and how can host communities cope with new pressures? Ana María's work has looked at these impacts in Colombia. The second question is how in-migration affects state-building – Anna has been trying to explore how this effects the imagining of Somaliland as a political community. Donor and host states are increasingly encouraging reflection on migration, and improving border control capacity etc. In large part this is in order to prevent transit migration. Despite the ambivalent attitude to the human rights record of countries such as Ethiopia, the international community has been quite ready to engage with such states on the governance of migration, and this is part of a wider trend of the exteriorisation of European immigration control and domestic security policy. This is another example of how development policy is affected by other types of policy, and it is important to think about such issues if we are interested in how Europe is perceived in the rest of the World.

Olivier Degomme

Philip Verwimp mentioned the Bosnia case where for several years people believed that around 300,000 people were killed during the war. After some detailed research and a public debate around this research, a consensus was reached around a more accurate figure of 100,000. Olivier mentioned some similar cases: Darfur, Iraq and the Democratic Republic of Congo.

In Darfur, for the same period, estimates ranged from 70,000 deaths to around 400,000 deaths; in Iraq estimates ranged from 65,000 to 650,000; and in the DRC estimates ranged from 200,000 to 5,000,000. These figures are important in the media, and they are used to try to raise public awareness of different crises around the world. The impact that the media has on public opinion also has an impact on policymakers. A problem is that there is no consensus on how to measure death tolls from conflict, which gives policymakers a lot of freedom to dismiss studies. George Bush dismissed the Lancet study on the death toll in Iraq, simply by saying "the methodology of this study is pretty much discredited". Although this study has been much criticised, the journalists did not question how the methodology might have been flawed, but simply accepted it. If there

was a generally accepted methodology, it might be more difficult for politicians to easily dismiss studies.

A second point related to the policy use of indicators is that policymakers have tried to make evidence-based decisions regarding humanitarian emergencies. Those decisions are often based on measures such as mortality rates, to decide whether an event is a humanitarian emergency. Often, with the crude mortality rate, the threshold for an emergency situation is one death per 10,000 population per day. Unfortunately, if this number has already been reached then it is already too late to intervene, so it is important to move to leading indicators. These could include nutrition and vaccination, which are earlier indicators of trends – this is not really an early warning system, but these indicators give a much more timely indication of problems. Mortality indicators still have a use, but there needs to be more focus on other kinds of indicators.

A final point is that in general we see that direct violence causes less than 20 per cent of deaths in conflicts, with some exceptions such as Iraq and the ex-Yugoslavia. Conflicts in developing countries tend to have a much higher death toll due to diseases, and many of these are due to displacement and living in bad conditions. For example in Darfur, more than two-thirds of the deaths occurred after the situation had stabilised, and many people were living in IDP camps. So, we might wonder whether living in these camps might be a bigger killer than sending people back to their villages. Violence tends to occur in peaks, and whilst the situation in Darfur was insecure, the biggest mass killings were due to disease in camps. Also, at a certain point in the conflict, humanitarian aid decreased and mortality in the camps increased significantly – this shows that sustainability in the camps is important, and that as soon as funding decreases, mortality increases because the conditions are really not appropriate.

Ana María Ibáñez

Anna talked about providing humanitarian aid, and Ana María talked about the situation in Colombia with regard to this. It is easier to provide humanitarian aid than it is to plan for development aid and livelihood policies, because it involves a challenging design and it is much more costly. In Colombia it seems that policymakers do not want to move to development aid because it is easier to provide humanitarian aid, and it is easier to demonstrate 'success'.

On the question of the return of refugees. There is a lot of heterogeneity in the decision to return. What we have found in Colombia is that only 11 per cent of the displaced population want to return. The people who want to return tend to be middle-aged men who want to reclaim their assets and have a lower capability of competing in urban labour markets as they only have agricultural experience. However widows do not want to return in any case. So when designing return policies it is important to take into account this heterogeneity of preferences.

Discussion

People reported varying findings on the health situation in IDP camps. Researchers in northern Uganda thought that the mortality rate in IDP camps there was not particularly high because of an influx of funding to them, in spite of the unsanitary conditions and overcrowding. However, there was also widespread sexual violence in the camps, contributing to a rise in the HIV prevalence rate. At the same time, the spreading of human rights ideas amongst women and their adoption led to increase gender violence. Humanitarian aid was also mainly targeted at women, leaving men to themselves, and increasing alcohol consumption.

Research by Carlos Bozzoli and Tilman Brück has found that health indicators for young children are 60 per cent worse in the camps compared to those who stayed home, despite better access to healthcare and drinking water. However it was pointed out that studies comparing the situation in camps and rural areas show mixed results: it depends on the setting, for example, whether there are security provisions, or whether militia operations are going on in the area. Assuming that all variables are the same for both IDP camps and rural areas, people living in camps would have higher probability of diseases, since the population density there is higher. In reality all variables are never the same.

Nevertheless, the overall findings reported by Olivier beg the question: how should we respond? Should we really withdraw assistance and send people back home? An alternative is to improve the situation in the camps.

Poverty and coping: Effects of violent conflict at the individual and household levels and strategies for adaptation to violence

Philip Verwimp

Philip's presentation did not focus on methodology, but was intended to be a kind of "1-pager" on concrete policy implications. Central to MICROCON is the conflict cycle, so Philip talked about policies for before, during and after violent conflicts. Even if we cannot always clearly distinguish between these three states, they can be a useful analytical distinction. The policy recommendations were derived from work by Philip, Patricia Justino, Eleonora Nillesen, Tom Bundervoet, Martin Voors, Tilman Brück, Carlos Bozzoli and Christophe Müller.

Before conflict: Developing countries are highly dependent on agriculture. They are rain fed economies, and without rain income, consumption and welfare goes down. A rain shock means that there will be a smaller harvest than previous years, and there will be more malnutrition and more starvation. This means that food aid needs to be provided or an alternative mechanism found to allow a certain level of welfare to be maintained. In conflict research we find that rain shocks do not just increase malnutrition, they also increase the risk of conflict (though they do not necessarily cause it). For example, local leaders might be angry that the government did not provide food aid and they see their families starve, leading to a violent reaction; another mechanism is that when income goes down, young men may look for another source of income outside agriculture and may join a nascent rebellion: in other words there is a lower opportunity cost of conflict. The policy implication of this is to provide insurance in the case of a rain shock. In the case of a rain shock the government should provide compensation for the loss people will suffer, though this may be difficult to implement.

A second event is price shocks. At the moment of harvest people want to sell their produce, and the income from these sales provide for people's families' welfare. If at the moment of harvest there is a negative price shock and the price of the crop that people have been working on for a whole year is a lot less than they thought, this can increase conflict risk. Governments should provide compensation for such losses. Another interesting policy question to investigate is the abolishment of the Stabex system in the name of liberalisation – has this increased the risk of conflict in export dependent economies?

Another potential driver of conflict is ethnic discourse, such as that employed in the Ivory Coast – a President that does not want his opponent to stand and develops an ethnic discourse which claims that he is not Ivorian. This can be extremely effective in driving violent conflict. The policy implication is that it is very important to stop the spreading of ethnic discourse through radio, newspaper and speeches, for example through the disruption of radio frequencies by the military. This can be done through diplomatic pressure on the elites. A further step in the conflict process is the formation of militias. Excluded political groups who cannot come to power through the ordinary political

processes sometimes form militias because no-one in the general population sympathises with their ideas, and so they seek to force people to listen to them. Donors need to send a strong, concerted message that the formation of militias is unacceptable, up to the withholding of aid.

During the conflict, poverty and coping research shows that short-term civil war shocks have long-term consequences such as stunting, which also means lower brain development, and also lack of education. It can be very difficult to catch up, and it is especially important that malnutrition does not affect small children, as the long-term consequences are particularly severe. So feeding small children is particularly important. There is also a need for security during conflicts, which means identifying who the vulnerable people are. It could be women in children, whereas in some conflicts, attacks particularly target rich people – it is at the micro-level that you can identify these groups. A policy frequently used to protect vulnerable populations is the setting up of camps by the government. However many people may not trust the government and may avoid the camps, and there may also be a high risk of disease. There is also a strong need for markets during conflict, as roads may be blocked. It is important that policies build on existing mechanisms and assets, and on people's coping mechanisms. People have different coping strategies in different areas and it is important to have an eye for these local level processes as this determines which policies are likely to help them – there is not one policy for all conflicts.

After the conflict the major objective is to avoid relapse into conflict. So, there should be inclusive processes and a peace agreement, where people are dealt with equally, and where justice is done and seen to be done. If people are dissatisfied they may return to violence at a later date. For disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration programmes we need to know what soldiers actually do when they settle down and what they do with their lump sum payments. Very few countries do this, and tracing these ex-soldiers is very important.

In the long term, if many people were unable to go to school, then investing in education will be important. In Northern Uganda, people often argue that only dealing with trauma is important, but what people (such as Lord's Resistance Army abductees) often also really want is the schooling they missed during their period of abduction.

Discussions

The discussants appreciated the concrete recommendations in Philip's presentation, and a number of questions were raised. For carrying out all of these policy actions, a lot of information is needed, and it was argued that both policymakers and researchers need to be original about how to get information. There also other barriers to these actions, for example to stop hate speech a judiciary is needed – there needs to be a way to overcome legal issues. There is also the problem of who decides what constitutes hate speech: in Côte d'Ivoire it was the president who was the first to start talking about 'Ivoirité'. Also donors can often be part of the problem rather than part of the solution: the dismantling of

stabex is one example, but there have also been many demonstrations recently in Africa against the proposed partnership agreements with the EU.

However, it was suggested that donors and ambassadors should play hardball, and force the government to tone down hate speech, especially in cases such as Rwanda, where the president gave one set of messages in French, and another in Kinyarwanda. This raises the question of leverage: donors' leverage is not balanced as they do not have leverage over rebel groups, and also if governments do not respond to threats to withdraw aid then donors are left with no leverage at all. It was also pointed out that groups can form militias that are popular, and the situation becomes complicated when such groups enter elections. The identity of the donor trying to exercise leverage is also important: for example the French lobbying to ban aid to Côte d'Ivoire would be seen as neo-colonialism – a more effective actor in this case might be the European Union or ECOWAS.

In relation to the policy of providing insurance for rain and price shocks, the question of dependency was raised. It was suggested that if this support was not constantly provided but only when needed in the case of bad harvests, this problem could be avoided. The FAO constantly monitor harvests, so we have the information for such interventions. Another point was that donors should continue providing development aid during conflicts, as people's lives go on, rather than just providing humanitarian aid, even if the strategy needs to be changed to take account of the war.